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A

THE BASIC LAW:
FIFTY YEAR ASSESSMENT
Donald P. Kommers*

N 1949, Germany embarked upon a fascinating constitutional experiment. In that year, with the consent of the three occupying powers,
the United States, France, and Great Britain, German leaders in the
western zone of occupation drafted a new constitution that created the
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). 1 They called it the Basic Law
(Grundgesetz) to highlight its provisional character. The more dignified
term "constitution" (Verfassung) would be reserved for the time when
Germany as a whole would determine its own future. Accordingly, the
.Basic Law, by its own terms, was to cease to exist on the day a reunited
it with a real constitution freely adopted by all the
Germany replaced
2
German people.
The Basic Law raised as many questions as it tried to answer. Could a
newly minted constitution-mere words on paper-breathe new life into
a people devastated by war? Would it serve as a framework of government? Would it promote respect for human rights and popular government? Would it foster internal political unity? And if the FRG were to
reach the half-century mark-as it would in 1999-how much of its success would be attributable to the values, rights, and powers laid down in
the Basic Law? No one would have dared to answer these questions in
1949. Now, however, on the Basic Law's fiftieth anniversary, we are able
to confidently respond to most of them.
I. THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT: ITS MAIN FEATURES
The sixty-one men and four women who framed the Basic Law-in an
assembly known as the Parliamentary Council-did so in the shadow of
the Third Reich and in the presence of a Communist dominated East
Germany. With these experiences burned into their souls, the sixty-five
delegates, whose median age was fifty-five, proceeded to create a constisecure political
tutional democracy that would rebuild the Rechtsstaat,
3
stability, protect human rights, and maintain peace.
* Professor, University of Notre Dame Law School.
1. See Final Communique on London Talks Regarding Germany, in DOCUMENTS ON
THE CREATION OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (Civil Administration Division:
Office of Military Government for Germany [U.SJ, Sept. 1, 1949) at 42 (June 1, 1948).

2. See

GRUNDGESETZ

[Constitution] [GG] art. 146 (F.R.G.).

3. For accounts of the proceedings of the Parliamentary Council see Entstehungsgeschichte der Artikel des Grundgesetzes, 1 JAHRBUCH DES OFFENTLICHEN RECHTS (1951);
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In reconstituting themselves as a free people, the framers did not-and
could not-reject their own democratic tradition, one best represented in
the Weimar Constitution of 1919. Many of its individual rights, provisions, and institutional arrangements were taken over by the Basic Law.
In important respects, however, the Basic Law also broke new ground. In
broad outline, the gulf between Weimar and Bonn (now Berlin) represented a major shift from a popular democracy to a constitutionaldemocracy, emphasizing limits on the exercise of political power and constraints
on majoritarian political institutions. The most interesting parts of the
Basic Law have to do with these limits and constraints. They make up
what might be called Germany's "new constitutionalism."'4
The cornerstone of the new constitutionalism can be found in an enforceable bill of rights. These rights include all the classical, civil, and
political freedoms of the western political tradition, but they also include
communal values-marriage, family, motherhood, and the right of parents to have their children exposed to religious education in the public
schools 5-that the state is obligated to protect and promote. Together
with the fundamental liberties of speech, association, and religion, the
Basic Law confers a general right to "personal freedom" as well as a
more specific right to "life and physical integrity."'6 These general rights
of liberty, like several other guaranteed rights, may be limited by law; in
no case, however "may the essence of a basic right be encroached upon."'7
Overarching and informing all of these rights and values is the principle
of human dignity, which the first article of the Basic Law declares "inviolable." In fact, Article 1 makes it the duty of "all state authority to respect
and protect" human dignity at all times. 8 In accentuating the primacy of
human dignity and the state obligations that derive from it, the Basic
Law-far more than the American Constitution-speaks in the language
of responsibilities as well as rights.
In addition, the Basic Law lays down structural principles of political
order. These include popular democracy, federalism, separation of powers, the rule of law, party competition, and certain principles of political
obligation:9 democracy manifests itself in representative institutions; federalism in strong state governments and local self-government; separation
of powers in the division of authority between the constitutional organs of
the national government; rule of law in a judiciary independent of the
WERNER SORGEL, KONSENSUS UND INTERESSEN (Ernst Klett Verlag 1969); JOHN FORD
GOLAY, THE FOUNDING OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1958); PETER H.
MERKL, THE ORIGIN OF THE WEST GERMAN REPUBLIC (1963). See also ERHARD M.

(1993).
4. Donald P. Kommers, German Constitutionalism:A Prolegomenon, 40

LANGE, DIE WtYRDE DER MENSCHEN IST UNANTASTBAR

EMORY

L.J.

837, 845-55 (1991).
5. See

GRUNDGESETZ

[GG] arts. 6, 7(2).

6. Id. art. 2.
7. Id. art. 19(2).
8. Id. art. 1.
9. For a detailed discussion of the jurisprudence related to these principles, together
with citations to relevant publications, see KLAUS STERN, I DAS STAATSRECHT DER
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND

555-871 (1984).
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executive and the legislature; party competition in open, free, and direct
elections; and principles of political obligation in the ban on activities aggressively opposed to the values and principles of the constitutional order. Equally constitutive of this order is the principle of the social
welfare state (Sozialstaat).10 Finally, and no less important, the Basic Law
(in its original version) looked to a unified Germany while committing
the Federal Republic to serving peace "as an equal partner in a united
Europe." 1
What differentiates these rights, values, and principles from previous
German constitutions is their supremacy and permanence. The Basic
Law represents the fundamental law of the nation. As such, it derives its
authority directly from the people, but all governmental authority is in
turn derived from the constitution. Accordingly, the Basic Law serves as
the supreme law of the land; it is a binding document and, as several of its
provisions attest, it controls the entire legal order, categorically rejecting
Weimar's principle of parliamentary supremacy in all things. 12 The Basic
Law declares that its rights and values "shall bind the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary as directly enforceable law." 1 3 To remove all
doubt about this, the Basic Law provides a judicial remedy for any violation of a basic right and creates a powerful
constitutional court to guard
14
and protect the constitution as a whole.
Besides its supremacy, the Basic Law establishes its core principles in
perpetuity. They are permanent. Article 79(3), the so-called "eternity
clause," bans any constitutional amendment that would affect or undermine the dignitarian principles of Article 1 or the basic structural principles of the constitutional order set forth in Article 20 (i.e., federalism,
separation of powers, rule of law, and the social welfare state). Putting
an eternity clause into a provisional constitution seemed jarringly incoherent. Nevertheless, the framers believed that the best way to safeguard
human dignity and preserve the "democratic and social federal state,"
now and in the future, was to place certain principles of government beyond the capacity of the people to amend-in short, to freeze history.
These principles include severe restrictions on anti-democratic activities,
one of the most important of which is the Basic Law's prohibition of political parties seeking "to impair or abolish the free democratic basic
15
order."
The political system created by the Basic Law was a bold experiment in
constitutional engineering, designed above all to combine popular democracy with political stability. In short, the framers set out to correct
the faults and close the loopholes believed to have contributed to Hitler's
10. See Hans F. Zacher, Das soziale Staatsziel, in I
1042-1112 (1987).
11. See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] preamble.
12. See GRUNDGESETZ [GG].
13. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 1(3).
14. See GRUNDGESETZ [GG].
15. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 21(2).

HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS,

at
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rise to power and Weimar's destruction in 1933. One major change was
the Basic Law's lack of any reference to popular referenda or initiatives
on national issues. A related change was the weakening of the office of
president. Under Weimar's Constitution, the president of the Reich was
elected by all the people and regarded as the embodiment of their will.
He could dissolve parliament, dismiss the chancellor, exercise emergency
powers, command the armed forces, suspend legislation, and submit laws
to a referendum. 16 Under the Basic Law, presidents can do none of these
things, and they no longer compete with the chancellor in the exercise of
governmental power. What is more, they are elected indirectly by a convention of state and federal parliamentary delegates and serve as relatively powerless and ceremonial heads of state.
The Basic Law lodges real executive power in the hands of the chancellor. It puts him in charge of the government and makes him its chief
policymaker. Although the chancellor is elected by and responsible to
parliament, parliament is unable to dismiss him unless it simultaneously
elects his successor. This so-called "constructive vote of no-confidence"
gives the chancellor considerable leverage over parliament. In the Weimar Republic, parliament could dissolve itself and trigger new elections,
with the result that no parliament survived the full term for which it was
elected. Under the Basic Law, by contrast, parliament may not dissolve
itself. Members of parliament are elected for a fixed term of four years in
universal adult suffrage. New elections can be held prior to the expiration of this four-year period only if the chancellor loses a vote of confidence that he initiates and then only if the federal president decides to call
for new elections at his or her (i.e., the chancellor's) request. 17 These
arrangements help to account for the relative stability of German governments over the last fifty years.
In still another break with the past, the Basic Law recognizes political
parties as major organs of parliamentary representation. On the other
hand, Article 21(2) declares unconstitutional those parties "which by reason of their aims or the conduct of their adherents seek to impair or abolish the free democratic basic order."' 18 This prohibition and related
provisions of the Basic Law, such as Article 9's ban on associations directed against the constitutional order, establish what has come to be
known as Germany's "guarded" democracy. It obliges the state to oppose persons and groups who would use their rights to subvert or destroy
democracy.' 9 Whatever else may be said about these provisions, they
16. For the full text and discussion of the Weimar Constitution, see ELMAR HUCKO,
DEMOCRATIC TRADITION: FOUR GERMAN CONS'ITUTIONS 147-90 (1987).
17. See GRUNDOESETZ [GG] art. 68. This procedure has been used only twice in the

Federal Republic's history, first by Willy Brandt in 1972 and then by Helmut Kohl in 1983.
In each instance, the chancellor engineered his defeat in the hope that new elections would
increase his parliamentary majority. The strategy worked for both chancellors.
18. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 21(2).
19. See Die wehrhafle Demokratie des Grundgesetzes, in VII HANDBUCH DES STAAT309-59 (1992); DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, 217-37 (1997). See also Judith Wise, Dissent and
SRECHTS
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certainly dampen, as the framers intended, popular pressures for revolutionary reform.
Germany's electoral system is both a reflection, as well as a determinant, of its party system. In setting up an electoral system, the framers
returned to Weimar's system of proportional representation, but with a
difference. They adopted a two-ballot system that combined single-member districts with proportional representation, along with the rule that
bars legislative representation to political parties failing to get at least five
percent of the national vote, a rule designed to rid Germany of the splinter parties that undermined effective parliamentary government in the
Weimar Republic. 20 Neither the electoral system, nor the five percent
rule is specified in the text of the Basic Law. But, their solid anchorage in
German electoral law (both state and federal) since 1949, and their canonical status in the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court,
has virtually elevated proportional representation and the five percent
21
rule into established constitutional practices.
Perhaps the most daring institutional innovation of the Basic Law is the
creation of the Federal Constitutional Court, a judicial tribunal empowered to resolve constitutional disputes between branches and levels of
government and to review the constitutionality of federal and state law.
As the guardian of the Basic Law, the Court was designed to serve as the
umpire of the federal system, the custodian of party democracy, and the
protector of all guaranteed values and rights. 22 In short, Germany's older
parliamentary democracy had been transformed into a new juridical democracy, solidifying the Rechtsstaat by keeping popular majorities from
exceeding the limits of the constitution.
II.

A TOO FLEXIBLE CONSTITUTION?

John Marshall, the great Chief Justice of the United States Supreme
Court, once remarked that a constitution by its nature "requires that only
its great outlines should be marked [and] its important objects designated."'23 He later sharpened the point by saying that "a constitution is
designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it. '' 24 In measuring the Basic Law against these standards, we
confront a document far less lapidary than our description of the new
constitutionalism might suggest. In its original form, the Basic Law consisted of a preamble and 146 articles, 151 if we include the five articles of
the Weimar Constitution on church-state relations absorbed into the Bathe Militant Democracy: The German Constitution and the Banning of the Free German
Workers Party, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 301-43 (1998).
20. For a comprehensive study of the German electoral process, see UWE W. KITZINGER, GERMAN ELECTORAL POLITICs: A STUDY OF THE 1957 CAMPAIGN (1960).
21. See KOMMERS, supra note 19, at 181-96.
22. For a general discussion of the status, proceedings, and decisions of the Federal
Constitutional Court, see KLAUS SCHLAICH, DAs BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT (1991).
23. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
24. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 387 (1821).

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

sic Law under Article 140. At least sixty of these articles dealt directly or
indirectly with federal-state relations. The detail in these provisions is as
much a result of Allied insistence on constitutionalizing the rights of the
states in the fields of tax policy and public administration as of any German penchant for precision and thoroughness.
By 1999, the Basic Law had ballooned into a document of 181 articles-185 if we again include the Weimar religious articles. It had been
amended forty-six times, almost one major amending act per year, introducing changes into 58 articles and 110 paragraphs of the original constitution. 25 Over and above these changes, 41 new articles were put into the
constitution, 21 paragraphs and clauses, of which were in turn amended
or repealed in subsequent years. These 41 articles are about one-third the
length of the original constitution. The United States Constitution, by
contrast, had been amended a miserly seventeen times between 1791 and
1999, an average of one amendment every twelve years. The Basic Law
was obviously not a perfect constitution. What constitution is?
A modern-day John Marshall would probably trace the Basic Law's
imperfection to its preoccupation with detail, or to its failure to distinguish between what he called "great outlines" and "minor details." It is
within the intent of a constitution, Marshall wrote, "to endure for ages to
come, and consequently to be adapted to the various crises of human
26
affairs."
On the other hand, Americans should be slow to accept the Marshallian critique of the Basic Law. After all, we Americans, along with the
British and the French, did not allow the Germans to adapt their constitution to the various crises of human affairs. It was not a document created
for ages to come, but for a transitional period. It was a seasonal document quickly drafted under Allied pressure and in the face of mushrooming hostility between East and West. It was likewise the product of a
divided and occupied Germany, reflecting the absence of sovereign nationhood and requiring transitional provisions on such matters as citizenship, refugees, elections, former Nazis, the status of Berlin, and the
organization of the federal territory. Little wonder that the Basic Law
would be in need of substantial amendment as West Germany gradually
regained her national sovereignty. As time passed, it would be necessary
to fill gaps and correct flaws in the original document. The transitional
provisions just mentioned required some seventeen changes over the
years.
III.

MAINTAINING THE CONSTITUTION

Most of the repair work on the Basic Law took place during the years
1954-56, 1968-69, and 1990-94. The first round of amendments adjusted
25. For a list of all amendments to the Basic Law and the articles, paragraphs, and
clauses affected thereby, see ANGELA BAUER & MATIMHIAS JESTAEDT, DAS GRUNDGESETZ IM WORTLAUT 53-65 (1997).
26. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 415.

2000]

A FIFTY YEAR ASSESSMENT

the Basic Law to the restoration of West German sovereignty and
remilitarization; the second round reflected the FRG's concern with internal and national security; the final round sought to harmonize the Basic Law with Germany's reunification and membership in the European
Union. Each of these periods represented transformative moments in
German constitutional politics. In addition, each round of amendments
took place in legislative periods in which it was relatively easy to garner a
two-thirds vote necessary to amend the Basic Law. In the first period
(1953-57), the Adenauer-led coalition parties were at the top of their
strength in both houses of parliament; in the second (1965-69), a grand
coalition between Social and Christian Democrats ruled the country; in
the third (1990-94), Germany reveled in the nation's reunification. The
three rounds of changes affected, respectively, 24, 61, and 38 articles of
the Basic Law.
A.

THE FIRST ROUND

West Germany's first great constitutional debate opened with the
Adenauer government's decision in 1952 to join the European Defense
Community (EDC).2 7 Would the Basic Law permit Germany to establish
a conscript army? The parliamentary opposition answered with an emphatic "no." Social Democrats and their supporters saw the Basic Law as
a peaceful constitution, one born of the Allied decision to demilitarize
Germany. They argued, correctly, that it conferred no explicit authority
to build an army and banned any preparation for military aggression. In
response, the government insisted that the "military aggression" clause
conferred an implied power to create an armed force for defensive purposes. In 1954, after two years of debate, and following the 1953 election,
all doubts about the legitimacy of Germany's membership in a defense
alliance were removed. The government succeeded in amending the Basic Law to authorize the Federation to provide for the country's defense
and a military draft. In 1956, finally, twelve additional articles were
amended to meet the requirements of a defense establishment.
The dispute over rearmament was a major chapter in the constitutional
politics of the FRG. It was also an important symbol of West Germany's
commitment to constitutional governance and the rule of law. Unable
initially to resolve the conflict politically, the parliamentary opposition,
the government, and the Federal President took turns in petitioning the
Federal Constitutional Court for a ruling on whether the FRG's membership in EDC would be constitutionally permissible. However, the 1954
amendments obviated the need for a judicial ruling. What is important
for present purposes is that all sides in the dispute accepted the
supremacy of the Basic Law and, equally significant, the legitimate role of
27.

For a treatment of the events surrounding this debate, see Karl Loewenstein, The

Bonn Constitution and the European Defense Community Treaties: A Study in Judicial
Frustration,64 YALE L.J. 805-39 (1955). See also Eckart Klein, Der innere Notstand, in
Handbuch, supra note 19, at 390-405.
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the Federal Constitutional Court in its interpretation. This was an encouraging sign for the future development of German constitutionalism.
B.

THE SECOND ROUND

The years 1968 and 1969 actually represented successive waves of constitutional change, the first centering on procedures for declaring and
managing a national emergency, the second on domestic policy concerns
and the federal-state relationship. The 1968 emergency amendments,
which added sixteen new articles to the document and repealed three old
ones, 28 extended the powers of the Federation to pass bills, issue directives, and take other measures to meet a foreign invasion or major civil
disturbance. What is interesting about these new provisions is the meticulous care taken by their authors to limit the duration of any emergency,
to require the Bundesrat's consent to emergency measures passed by the
Bundestag, and to curtail civil liberties no more than necessary. In fact,
Article 115(g) provides that the powers and functions of the Federal Constitutional Court may not be set aside or changed during a state of emergency. To this extent, the changes in the Basic Law gave way to German
critics who regarded the emergency amendments as a license for governmental oppression and dictatorship.
Fierce opposition greeted the emergency amendments when originally
debated, triggering violent street demonstrations and other forms of unrest. 29 The broader context of German politics helps to explain the oppo-

sition. The mid-to-late 1960s were transitional years in German politics.
A cultural revolution was in the making. Universities were under siege.
The Cold War was heating up. Anti-Americanism, spawned by the Vietnam War, was on the rise, and anti-militarism was one of its consequences. 30 In the mind of its critics, moreover, Bonn's grand coalition
(1966-69) subverted the democratic process by virtually eliminating an
effective parliamentary opposition. The result was the birth of an extraparliamentary "New Left" movement that would grow in numbers and
stridency in the years ahead.
The 1969 wave, on the other hand, followed the end of the grand coalition, marking still another turning point in Germany's constitutional development. Helped by the "New Left" movement, the Social Democratic
Party (SPD), led by Willy Brandt, came to power in Bonn for the first
time in the postwar period. The constitutional emphasis now shifted to
the domestic scene. Two amending acts affecting some twenty articles of
the Basic Law dealt mainly with budgetary and fiscal affairs, reaffirming
and concluding West Germany's emancipation from all Allied dictates
over the relationship between the federation and the states. Constitu28. See table of amendments and subsequent changes in the text of the Basic Law in
& JESTAEDT, supra note 25, at 53-65.
29. See DENNIS L. BARK & DAvIi R. GRESS, DEMOCRACY AND ITS DISCONTENTS
1963-1991 120-21 (1993).
30. See id. at 121-36.
BAUER
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tional changes awarded new powers to the federation over the field of
higher education, loosened certain restrictions on budgetary planning,
modified guidelines for the apportionment of tax revenues among levels
of government, and conferred discretionary instead of mandatory authority on the Federation to modify state boundary lines. In short, the authors of these amendments had realigned the federal-state relationship in
favor of more power at the center and in conformity to perceived social
31
and economic needs.
The trend toward constitutionalizing central legislative power continued in the 1970s. Additional amending acts during these years expanded
the federation's authority over several domestic policy areas, the most
controversial of which was police activity. The political turmoil that
started with the emergency amendments of 1968 had not subsided, and
internal security remained high on the constitutional agenda. Accordingly, the Basic Law was amended to authorize a greater federal role in
police investigation, 32 in compiling data on subversive activity, 33 in securing the loyalty of public servants, 34 and in controlling commerce in weap35
ons and explosives.
The internal security amendments were deemed necessary to combat
domestic terrorism as well as less dangerous forms of anti-state activity.
Several other amendments, however, expanded West Germany's democracy and reinforced political accountability. They did so by lowering the
voting age to eighteen, 36 by requiring political parties to publicly account
for the uses (as well as the sources) of their funds, 37 and by providing for
a parliamentary petitions committee to hear the complaints of ordinary
citizens. 38 These changes supplemented a 1969 amendment that conferred a constitutional right on all persons to file individualized complaints with the Federal Constitutional Court to vindicate their
guaranteed rights against any interference by the state. 39 The Basic Law
had changed in substantial ways to meet the needs of internal security,
but it was also amended to reinforce its underlying principles of democracy and Rechtsstaatlichkeit.
C. THE THIRD ROUND
The extension of the Basic Law to the five new Ldnder of the old German Democratic Republic (GDR) required considerable constitutional
surgery, and the Unity Treaty wielded the scalpel. We may pass over
amendments that repealed Article 23 (extending the Basic Law's reach to
31. BAUER & JESTAEDT, supra note 25, at 57-60.
32. See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] arts. 73(10), 87(1) (1972).

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. art.
id. art.
id. art.
id. art.
id. art.
id. art.
id. art.

87(1).
74a (1971).
74(4a) (1972).
38(2) (1970).
21(1) (1983).
45(c) (1975).
93(1) [4a] (1969).
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new territories) and expunged all other references in the Basic Law to the
goal of unity or the recovery of other lost German territory. Article 23's
repeal effectively froze Germany's present borders, legally foreclosing
any further claims to territory lost in World War II. We may also pass
over changes required in the structure of the Bundesrat as well as an article temporarily releasing the new Linder from obedience to certain constitutional provisions. More important for present purposes are treaty
provisions amending Article 146 and recommending future changes in the
Basic Law, 40 matters taken up below in the discussion of constitutional
reform.
A series of amendments passed in 1993 and 1994 brought the Basic
Law into accord with the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, expanded the authority of the federation over new activities and operations,
clarified the rights of the Linder in European affairs, and enlarged their
powers of consent in the Bundesrat. The most significant of these
changes was a new seven-paragraph Article 23 permitting the transfer of
sovereign power to the European Union. A related change in Article 88
authorized the Federal Bank to transfer its responsibilities and powers to
the European Central Bank. Another amendment conferred on foreign
nationals of the European Union the right to vote in local elections, 4 1 a
change that reversed a decision of the Federal Constitutional Court inval42
idating the right of non-citizens to vote in such elections.
Other amendments in the 1990s authorized the privatization of the railroads, air transport, postal services, and other operations directly administered by the Federation. The national government's power was also
expanded to include concurrent jurisdiction over genetic engineering and
human transplants, not to mention new authority to lay down guidelines
for preventing the transfer abroad of cultural property. It is worth noting
that nearly every major extension of the Bundestag's legislative authority
was accompanied by provisions requiring the Bundesrat's consent to the
exercise of such authority. Article 20(a), a new provision, contained a
directive requiring the state to protect "the natural sources of life." Still
other changes reallocated tax revenue, modified legislative procedures,
43
and authorized state boundary changes.
IV. CHANGE AND CONTINUITY
Constitutional change in the Federal Republic shows that the Basic
Law had been transformed into a document very different from the version adopted by the Parliamentary Council in 1949. A modern-day John
Marshall might say that the difference is in the details or "minor ingredi40. See Donald P. Kommers, The Basic Law Under Strain: Constitutional Dilemmas
and Challenges, in DOMESTIC POLITICS OF GERMAN UNIFICATION 135-54 (Christopher An-

derson et al. eds, 1993). See also Donald P. Kommers, The Basic Law and Reunification, in
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AT FORTY-FIVE

41. See

GRUNDGESETZ

[GG] art. 28(1) (1992).

187-204 (Peter Merkl ed., 1995).

42. See BVerfGE 83, 37.
43. See BAUER & JESTAEDT, supra note 25, at 62-64.
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ents." He might suggest that the Basic Law has been distended into an
unwieldy bulk that mocks the contrast between triviality and fundamentality. Indeed, he could point out that fifty percent of all constitutional changes in the written document modified the minutiae of sections
dealing with public administration, court organization and jurisdiction,
taxation and public finance, a state of emergency, and transitional provisions. But, this all too American perspective overlooks and ignores the
culture of the German Rechtsstaat, a culture that requires, in deference to
the rule of law, that legal documents provide as much guidance as possible to their interpretation by the judiciary and other government
agencies.
The three rounds of constitutional amendments are equally important
for what they have not changed. In particular, they have not touched the
fundamental principles and structures of the Basic Law. Democracy, federalism, separation of powers, the rule of law, the Sozialstaat, and the
multiparty state have remained largely undiminished. Their integrity,
moreover, can be said to have been enhanced by the decisions of the
Federal Constitutional Court. Also largely untouched by amendments
were the Basic Law's sections on parliament, Bundesrat, federal presidency, chancellor and cabinet, and the Federal Constitutional Court, each
of which is a major constitutional organ of the Federal Republic. Even
the twenty-nine textual changes in the section on federal legislative powers failed to alter the essential character of German federalism, 44 as the
increasingly important role of the Bundesrat tended to show.
More serious were the textual changes in the Bill of Rights (Articles 117). But even here, nine of the original seventeen articles that protect
fundamental rights remain unamended. These include the general right
to "personal freedom" as well as the more specific right to "life and physical integrity."'4 5 The unamended articles also include those guaranteeing
freedom of religion, 46 freedom of speech, 47 freedom of assembly, 48 and
the right to property, 49 along with articles providing for the protection of
44. Some observers would disagree with this view. The original version of the Basic
Law conferred numerous and important powers on the states. Developments over the
years eroded many of these powers, however. By the 1960s, the Federal Republic was
described as a unitary (unitarische) federal state, i.e., one with strong centralizing features.
By the early 1970s, it was also characterized as a system of cooperative federalism, and, by
the late 1970s, as a system of Politikverflechtung,a complex form of joint decision making
among many centers of power and influence. Many commentators came to believe that
federalism, despite the eternity clause, had become a facade for an increasingly centralized
state, especially in regard to public finances, and that the states had lost much of their
relevance as legislative bodies. This assessment is flawed, however. In spite of certain
losses of power by the states, they remain important political and administrative units in a
relatively decentralized governmental system, particularly in view of recent constitutional
amendments requiring the Bundesrat's consent to European policies affecting vital local
interests.
45. See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 2 (2000).
46. See id. art. 4.
47. See id. art. 5.
48. See id. art. 8.
49. See id. art. 14.
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marriage and family 5° and parental rights in education. 5 1 Eight articles of
the Bill of Rights, however, have been altered in some fashion. By contrast, the American Bill of Rights has never been amended. Amendments to four of these articles actually expanded the guaranteed right
affected, 52 whereas several other changes adjusted the Bill of Rights to
remilitarization and emergency defense requirements. But, any emergency justifying a limitation on a guaranteed right would have to be declared by the Bundestag and consented to by the Bundesrat, a significant
political protection against any arbitrary invasion of a basic liberty. Article 12(a), the result of remilitarization, actually secured the right to refuse
military service involving armed combat, but it required conscientious objectors to perform alternative service.
Amendments that caused the most alarm among German civil libertarians restricted the right of privacy and the right to asylum. Articles 10 and
13 secured the inviolability, respectively, of the secrecy of the mails and
of the home. The former was amended in 1968, to allow interferences
with private communications, without the knowledge of the affected parties, when necessary to protect the free democratic order; the second was
amended in 1998 to allow law enforcement agencies to employ electronic
surveillance when they suspect serious criminal activity that endangers
individuals or the public. Did these amendments encroach on the "essence" of a basic right in violation of Article 19(2)? As for Article 10, the
Federal Constitutional Court said "no" even in the face of the provision
that barred judicial review of restrictions on private communications. 53
The Court's 5-3 decision struggled to reconcile the principle of human
dignity with the need for Germany's "guarded democracy" to protect itself against foreign and domestic enemies. Whether these amendments
were necessary to achieve their stipulated ends is an open question. After all, the rights guaranteed in Articles 10 and 13, like many basic rights,
are subject to limitation by ordinary laws, and these laws in turn are subject to judicial review.
The third amendment (Article 16(a), ratified in 1993) seriously qualified the right to asylum. The original right was a powerful expression of
Germany's political morality in the light of the nation's past. It granted
an absolute right to asylum to all persons persecuted on political grounds.
In the early 1990s, however, hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers
were clamoring at the nation's gates, causing severe pressures on the domestic economy and on administrative courts. Article 16(a) was designed
to deal with this problem; it limits the former unlimited right in part by
making neighboring countries responsible for handling asylum claims.
An asylum claimant can now be held up at an international airport if he
50. See id. art. 6.
51. See GRUNDGESETZ [GG]

art. 7.
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 1(3) (1956); GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 3a
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 9(3) (1968); GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 12 (1968).
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or she has not sought asylum in certain neighboring countries. 54 Although the subject of enormous controversy, the new article had no impact on the rights of German citizens or resident aliens. The right to
asylum was cut back substantially, but most commentators regarded it
less as a German than a European problem that would have to be resolved by European institutions.
In short, while the German constitution changed in substantial ways
over the years, the changes did not erode the essential nature of the constitution as a charter of limited government and individual rights. Some
amendments may have posed potential threats to civil liberties, but in
each case, the Federal Constitutional Court handed down rulings curtailing abuses arising from them. The Court has not only been an effective instrument in protecting the essence of basic rights, it has also played
a significant role in adapting the constitution to changing conditions. At
the end of the day, these judicial adaptations seem more important than
formal constitutional amendments. The Constitutional Court has been at
the epicenter of Germany's system of government-the Basic Law put it
there-influencing the shape of its politics, guarding its institutions, circumscribing its powers, promoting the constitution's political morality,
and securing the effective enjoyment of basic rights. 55 What is more, the
record of official compliance with the court's decisions, even in highly
controversial cases, has been extraordinary. To this extent, Germany's
Rechtsstaat continues to thrive.
V.

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM

The last fifty years have been punctuated by decennial evaluations of
the Basic Law and occasional calls for its total revision. 56 The evaluations
led to few, if any, changes, and all appeals for major constitutional revision have been rejected. By 1989, most commentators believed the Basic
Law had survived the test of time. The institutions it created were functioning pretty much as planned. Stability and peace had been accomplished under its auspices. The Rechtsstaat and the Sozialstaat coexisted
in relative harmony. Civil liberties were generally respected and jealously guarded by the courts, as the decisional law of the Federal Constitutional Court demonstrates. Meanwhile, the Constitutional Court had
created a legacy fully comparable in volume and sophistication to the
postwar jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court. This legacy
included four decades of constitutional scholarship, as voluminous as it
was distinguished. In short, a growing and vibrant constitutional tradition
had been created, infusing the Basic Law with the character of a document framed to last in perpetuity.
54. See BVerfGE 94, 49 (reporting Federal Constitutional Court decision upholding
this policy).
55. See KOMMERS, supra note 19; DAVID CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
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Then the unanticipated happened. Germany reunified, offering 64 million West Germans and 16 million East Germans a chance to reconstitute
themselves as a people under a new, or at least substantially revised, constitution. The Unity Treaty itself held out hope of major constitutional
change. It instructed the soon-to-be-chosen all-German parliament to
have the Basic Law reviewed in the light of national unity and to consider
submitting it, at long last, to a popular referendum. In fact, the treaty
retained the Basic Law's contingent status. Although it declared the Basic Law valid for the entire nation, it kept the language of Article 146
calling for its termination when the German people freely adopt a new
57
constitution.
Parliament made good on the promise to review the Basic Law. It established a sixty-four member legislative commission on constitutional revision comprised of an equal number of members from the Bundestag
and Bundesrat. Over a period of fifteen months (from January 1992 to
March 1993), the joint commission solicited and considered proposals for
constitutional renewal from a wide circle of governmental and non-governmental sources, including dozens of constitutional scholars. Hundreds
of proposals were received, seeking mainly to realign the federal-state
relationship, to grant more autonomy to local communities, to incorporate state objectives into the Basic Law, to introduce social and economic
rights, and to open the political system to more citizen participation, including the adoption of initiatives and referenda at the federal level. Perhaps the most favored of all proposals was the submission of the Basic
Law itself to a popular referendum.
Nearly all these recommendations were rejected, including the referendum on the Basic Law. 58 Constitutional changes that won the joint commission's approval included several provisions authorizing Germany to
participate in the European Union. As noted earlier, they also included a
new amendment obliging the state to protect the environment. Egalitarian impulses from East and West Germany, particularly among women's
groups, resulted in an amendment to Article 3, paragraph 2, which in its
original version secures equal rights to men and women. A new sentence
authorizes the state to adopt measures for doing away with existing inequalities between men and women. Another change added "physical disability" to the list of forbidden legislative classifications under paragraph
3.
The defeat of proposals to introduce methods of direct democracy was
a major letdown for persons appalled and disillusioned by what they regarded as an increasingly frozen political system governed by entrenched
elites and ossified party structures. The joint commission did not wish to
57. The new version reads: "This Basic Law, which since the achievement of the unity
and freedom of Germany applies to the entire German people, shall cease to apply on the
day on which a constitution freely adopted by the German people takes effect."
GRUNDOESETZ [GG] art. 146.
58. See HELGA-LOTHAR BA'r-r, DIE GRUNDGESETZREFORM NACH DER DEUTSCHEN
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modify the representationalcharacter of Germany's political order. Nor
did the commission see any value in proposals to allow parliament to dissolve itself or to abolish the five percent clause governing federal and
state elections. Constitutional experts inside and outside parliament felt
that such changes would pose the danger of fragmenting the electorate
and thus undermine the stability and balance that constitutional arrangements adopted in 1949 were designed to secure.
VI. CONCLUSION
The questions posed at the beginning of this essay can, for the most
part, be answered in the affirmative. The Basic Law has served as a relatively stable framework of government: it has resulted in the effective
realization of human rights; it has served as a rallying cry for Germany's
reunification; and it has contributed to the growth of German democracy.
All the major elements of a modern large-scale democracy are present.
These include parliamentary representation; free, fair, and frequent elections; freedom of expression; sources of information not under governmental control; and a civil society made up of independent associations
and interest groups. This is not to say that German democracy is perfect.
It is imperfect, as are all existing democracies. It is sufficient to suggest
that German democracy is as durable and stable as any other long-lasting
democracy in the western world.
Whether the Basic law is the principal cause of Germany's stability and
durability over the last fifty years is a harder question. It has often been
said that German democracy owes its success to peace and prosperity.
There is little doubt that social and economic conditions have been highly
favorable to the stability of Germany's democratic institutions. But, it
would be foolhardy at this late date to suggest that the Basic Law has not
had a significant influence on the development of Germany's constitutional democracy. We lack exact measurements of the Basic Law's influence, but this uncertainty should not obscure the fact that German
democracy would look differently if it were not for the normative principles and constitutional arrangements prescribed by it.
What does seem certain is the constitution's influence on German public attitudes. The constitution's legitimacy is no longer contested, even by
those who would liked to have seen the Basic Law ratified in a popular
referendum. Obscured by popular indifference in the early 1950s, the Basic Law has emerged as the vital center of Germany's constitutional culture. It is invoked repeatedly in parliamentary debates and resorted to in
litigation by parties and politicians of all colors, which is one sign of the
unity and integration it has managed to produce. It has guided multiple
transformations in the country's political and social life; by any standard,
it has been as adaptable to change as it has been successful in maintaining
democracy and the rule of law. In fact, the Basic Law has evolved into
one of the world's most respected and imitated constitutions. This alone
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is a major achievement that could not have been realized without the
success the Basic Law has enjoyed in Germany.
The Basic Law's success is in no small measure owing to the institution
of constitutional review and the work of the Federal Constitutional
Court. Indeed, the constitution's fundamentality has been reinforced by
fifty years of authoritative interpretation and scholarly commentary,
overlaying the Basic Law with the silver plates of both permanence and
esteem. In saying this, we need to emphasize once again that the Basic
Law is not perfect. This essay has pointed out several of its imperfections, not the least of which is its prolixity and the relative ease with
which it can be amended. Constitutional politics should not be confused
with ordinary politics. This is a distinction that frequency of amendment
often overlooks. Many of the minor ingredients of the Basic Law could
well be eliminated without doing any damage to its integrity as the fundamental law of the nation.
When Benjamin Franklin emerged from the American constitutional
convention in 1789, he was asked what kind of government had been created. He replied, "A republic if you can keep it." Fifty years later, in
1839, in a discourse delivered at the request of the New York Historical
Society, John Quincey Adams, the sixth President of the United States,
was able to report that the Constitution had indeed survived the test of
time and that "its results have surpassed the most sanguine anticipations
of its friends." The same judgment could be made about the Basic Law in
1999, fifty years after its birth.

